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11 Introduction
It is well established that exporting plants pay higher wages on average than nonexporting
plants in the same industry (Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1997). Mirroring this fact, recent
advances in trade theory have gone in the direction of introducing features of non-neoclassical
labor markets (e.g. search frictions, bargaining, rent-sharing, and eciency wages) into trade
models with heterogeneous rms based on Melitz (2003) or Bernard et al. (2003). Unlike
their predecessors, these new models are consistent with the presence of wage inequality and,
in particular, with the existence of a wage premia for exporting rms (e.g. Eaton et al.
(2011),Helpman et al. (2011),Felbermayr et al. (2011), and Egger & Kreickemeier (2009)).
Despite the existing evidence, it is still however not clear why exporters pay higher wages.
Many studies have taken advantage of the availability of increasingly rich data sets (in partic-
ular, matched employer-employee data) to estimate more and more demanding econometric
specications. They usually nd two results. First, the unconditional exporter wage pre-
mium is quite large, usually in the order of 20 to 30 percent. Second, the premium lingers
on after controlling for an impressive number of covariates, describing rms' and workers'
observed characteristics or accounting for workers' and/or rms' xed eects or even worker-
rm spells. However, the remaining wage premium is usually very small, in the order of 2 to 3
percent, compared to the unconditional one and even in absolute terms. Moreover, there are
at least two major aws common to the previous literature. First, as pointed out by Gelbach
(2010), the standard approach used to quantify the importance of each covariate (rms and
workers observables and unobservables characteristics) in explaining the dierence between
the unconditional and conditional wage premium is seriously awed. The standard practice
of sequentially adding explanatory variables and interpreting the change in the coecient of
interest (i.e. the coecient associated to being an exporter) as due to the introduction of the
latest covariate is dependent on the arbitrary choice of the order of introduction of the co-
variates. Dierent orders deliver dierent results and none is, usually, free of biases. Second,
most of the studies do not control for the import activity of the rms. Besides being of equal
interest to study if there is a wage premium for importers, the fact that many exporters do
also import introduces a bias in the estimation of the exporter wage gap. In this paper we
deal with these two issues. The goal is to provide a cleaner comparison of the determinants of
the wage gap of exporters and importers. Such an analysis can provide a useful guidance for
2developing theories that explain participation both in export and import markets. Overall,
a robust result that emerges from this paper is that the hiring policy of exporters is quite
dierent than the one of importers.
In this paper, we apply a new methodology proposed in Gelbach (2010) to a rich matched
employer-employee data set, well-known for its wide coverage and high quality, to investi-
gate the relationship between exporting, importing, and wage premia. We stress two main
methodological contributions. First, we take into account the importing behavior of rms.
We distinguish between rms that only export, rms that only imports, and rms that both
exports and imports. Given that the export status of a rm is a good predictor of its import
status Bernard & Schott (2009), rm- or worker-level studies of the link between exports and
wages that do not control for imports (e.g. Schank et al. (2007), Munch & Skaksen (2008),
Frias et al. (2009)) may over- or underestimate the impact of exports.1 Second, we use a
simple methodology introduced in Gelbach (2010) to quantify the importance of rm's ob-
served characteristics, and workers' observed and unobserved time-invariant characteristics
in determining the exporters', importers, and exporters-importers' wage premia. The main
advantage of this methodology is that it is not sensitive to the order of introduction of the
covariates. As shown in Gelbach (2010), the strategy of sequentially adding covariates and
interpreting the change in the coecient of interest as associated to the introduction of each
covariate is incorrect because results are sensitive to the order in which the covariates are
introduced.
In the core of the paper we estimate two wage equations at the worker-level. The rst
("base") model contains only a set of dummies for export-only, import-only, and export-
import rms, and delivers the a set of unconditional wage premia by trade status. We nd
that once export and import status are simultaneously controlled for, the unconditional wage
1More in general, there are many reasons why a partial refocusing on imports is needed. First, imports may
matter more than exports in terms of their scope to aect welfare. As Krugman (1994) put it, `[T]he purpose
of international trade - the reason it is useful - is to import, not to export. That is, what a country really
gains from trade is the ability to import things it wants. Exports are not an objective in and of themselves.'
Second, as the magnitude of imports is approximately equal to that of exports, imports clearly have a signicant
potential in terms of labor-market eects. Also, imports from developing countries have been regarded as a
potentially major force driving the rising wage inequality observed in the U.S. and other countries (Freeman
(1995) reviews this literature). This view stemmed from the factor price equalization result in international
trade theory and the still large wage dierences between developed and developing countries. Third, imports
have recently been shown to generate important productivity eects, through channels involving learning,
variety or quality aspects Amiti & Konings (2007), Goldberg et al. (2008), Halpern et al. (2009). In this
context, it is possible that the increased prots resulting from the purchase of (higher-quality) intermediate
inputs from foreign manufacturers be eventually shared with the rm's workers in terms of wages that exceed
those workers' outside options. Such rent sharing would conceivably occur in labor markets that exhibit
non-competitive features.
3premium paid by export-only rms becomes quite small (3.5 percent), as compared to the
previous literature, while both the wage gap paid by rms that only imports and the one paid
by exporter-importers is very large (23.9 and 29.1 percent, respectively). As mentioned above,
the export status of a rm is a good predictor of its import status Bernard & Schott (2009),
implying that studies that do not control for imports may overestimate the impact of exports.
The second ("full") model encompasses the "base" model and extends it by considering a large
set of worker-level and rm-level observable characteristics as well as worker xed eects. Our
estimates conrm and, to some extent, reinforce a tendency seen in the previous literature: the
introduction of rms' and workers' controls explain the almost totality of the unconditional
wage premium.
Our main results though come from the application of the Gelbach (2010) methodology to
the "base" and "full" model. The decomposition reveals that the wage premium for workers
employed by rms that only export is associated to rms' and workers' characteristics that
are very dierent from those associated to the wage premium paid by rms that also imports.
Export-only rms pay higher wages mainly because they have a bigger workforce and sell
more. Their workers are not, generally, "better" or "more able" than average. Firms that
also imports (imports-only or exporters-importers) also pay higher wages because they are
bigger and sell more but these factors denitely play a less important role. On the contrary,
these rms, and among these especially those that only imports, decisively employ "better" or
"more able" workers. More specically, in the case of export-only rms, rm-level observables
(size, total sales, number of plants, and rm age) account for 80 percent of the wage gap, with
the main role played by rm size (32 percent) and rm total sales (40 percent). Worker xed
eects, capturing all the time-invariant unobserved workers' characteristics, have a limited
and negative impact on the exporter wage gap (2 percent). The picture is quite dierent
for importers. Firm-level observables are still important but only account for 30 percent
of the wage gap, with the main role played again by rm size (12 percent) and rm total
sales (17 percent). The striking dierence lies in the role played by workers' (time-invariant)
unobserved characteristics: worker xed eects account for a whopping 66 percent of the wage
gap. The sign is positive: the wage bill of importers is higher because workers are, on average,
much more able.
Recently, a number of papers have extended the two main models of trade with heteroge-
4neous rms to allow for a more realistic description of the labor market. Our results can be
interpreted as a rst test for these recent studies. In Eaton et al. (2011), wages, set through
bargaining, are an increasing function of the productivity of the rm. More productive rms
are also those that enter more markets and sell more in each market and enter less popular
markets. Our results are consistent with Eaton et al. (2011) in the sense that we do nd that
rms' productivity is positively associated with a wage premium for exporters. Helpman et al.
(2011) propose a model where more productive rms have large revenues, match with more
workers, and screen to higher ability thresholds. As a result they have workforces of higher av-
erage ability and pay higher wages. While we also nd that rm's size and sales are positively
correlated with a wage premium for exporters, we do not nd that exporters hire workers
that are, on average, more able. Actually, the workers xed eects in our wage regressions
play almost no role in explaining the exporters' wage premium. On the contrary, we nd that
importers denitely hire workers that have better unobserved time-invariant characteristics.
In this respect, our results suggest that the channel suggested by Helpman et al. (2011) seems
more adequate to explain the behavior of importers.
The spirit of our paper is close to the one of Moxnes et al. (2010). They pose the question
if exporters are more productive than nonexporters because of dierences in rms' intrinsic
eciencies or because of dierences in the composition of the workforce. They nd that aug-
mented measures of total factor productivity which take worker characteristics into account,
indicate that 15-40 percent of the exporter premium reects dierences in workforce rather
than true eciency. Exporters typically employ workers with longer tenure, more experi-
ence and higher education than the average non-exporter. There are two main dierences
between Moxnes et al. (2010) and our paper. First, their focus is on explaining the exporters'
productivity premium while our focus is on explaining the wage premium of both exporters
and importers and, in particular, in assessing the relative importance of rm characteristics,
workers' observed characteristics, and workers' unobserved characteristics. We employ a new
methodology that allows us to determine the importance of each of the above factors indepen-
dently from the order of introduction into the wage equation. Second, even if Moxnes et al.
(2010) control for workers' unobserved time-invariant characteristics in estimating a Mince-
rian wage equation they do not focus on the dierences between exporters and nonexporters
in terms of workers' unobserved characteristics.
5Finally, there has been, in the recent literature, a small surge of papers interested in the
eect of importing on rm productivity, employment and wages. To begin with, exporters are
frequently importers as well Bernard & Schott (2009), in which case part of the productivity
advantage of exporters can be due to their sourcing inputs from foreign markets Altomonte
& Bekes (2009). In any case, either that of importers only or exporter-importers, access to
cheaper imported inputs can again raise productivity via learning, variety, and quality eects.2
Importers arguably have greater choice in the sourcing of their inputs and can exploit any
gaps between international and national prices, resulting in productivity or cost-eciency dif-
ferences. A recent literature has focused on the eects of outsourcing and oshoring Kramarz
(2008), Hummels et al. (2010), Mitra & Ranjan (2010), two forces which can be important
components of rm-level imports. Their emergence in the last decade has prompted concerns
that the previous consensus of a relatively unimportant eect of international trade (and
imports in particular) on wages may no longer apply Krugman (2008).
The remaining of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the two data sets used and
several descriptive statistics. Section 3 describes the methodology used to quantify the deter-
minants of the wage gap by rm trade status and shows, by means of a simple example, why
the standard sequential approach leads to biased results. Section 4 presents our main results
and, nally, Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix we provide further details on the data used
and summarize the theoretical linkages between exporting, importing, and wages.
2 The matched employer-employee and customs trade data
The data used in this paper are obtained from merging two major data sets: the INE trade
data and the QP labor data. The INE trade data includes all export and import transactions
by rms that are located in Portugal, on a monthly basis. These data are derived from
customs returns forms in the case of extra-EU trade and from a special form supplied to
the Portuguese statistics agency, INE - Instituto Nacional de Estat stica, in the case of intra-
EU trade (Intrastat). Overall, the data amount to the ocial total exports and imports of
Portugal.
Each transaction record includes the rms tax identier, an eight-digit Combined Nomen-
clature product code, the value of the transaction, the quantity of transacted goods, the
2See Amiti & Konings (2007), Kasahara & Rodrigue (2008), Goldberg et al. (2008), Halpern et al. (2009).
6destination/origin country, the relevant international commercial term, etc. We were able to
gain access to data from 1995 to 2005 for the purpose of this research.
The second main data source is Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal dataset matching
all rms and workers based in Portugal. The data are made available by the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security, drawing on a compulsory annual census of all rms in Portugal
that employ at least one worker. Indeed, each year every establishment with wage earners is
legally obliged to ll in a standardized questionnaire. Reported data cover the establishment
itself, the rm and each of its workers. The variables available in the data set include the rm's
location, industry, total employment, sales, ownership structure (domestic private, public or
foreign), and legal setting. The individual data cover information on all personnel working
for each rm in a reference month (October), except for 2001. They include information
on gender, age, occupation, schooling, hiring date, earnings, duration of work, etc. The
information on earnings is very complete. It includes the base wage (gross pay for normal
hours of work), seniority payments, regular benets, irregular benets and overtime pay.
Each rm entering the database is assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number
which we use to follow rms over time. The Ministry of labor and Social Security implements
several checks to ensure that a rm that has already reported to the database is not assigned
a dierent identication number. Similarly, each worker also has a unique identier, based
on the worker's social security number, which we use to follow individuals over time. The
administrative nature of the data and their public availability at the workplace - as required by
the law - imply a high degree of coverage and reliability. The public availability requirement
facilitates the work of the services of the Ministry of Employment that monitor the compliance
of rms with the law (e.g., illegal work).3
Finally, we merged the two data sets using the rm identiers and rm characteristics
available in each data set. Given the predominance of manufacturing in international trade,
we excluded from our analysis non-manufacturing sector rms.4 We restrict the sample to
3The same data set has been used by, amongst others, Cabral & Mata (2003) to study the evolution of the
rm size distribution; by Blanchard & Portugal (2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets in
terms of unemployment duration and worker ows; by Cardoso & Portugal (2005) to study the determinants of
both the contractual wage and the wage cushion (dierence between contractual and actual wages); by Martins
(2009) to study the eect of employment protection on worker ows and rm performance. See these papers
also for a description of the Portuguese labor market.
4See Amador & Opromolla (2008) for more information about the data and several additional descriptive
statistics. In particular, Amador & Opromolla (2008) shows that in 2005 about 19 percent of Portuguese
exports belong to \Machinery, electrical equipment", 14 percent to \Vehicles, aircraft, vessels", 13 percent to
\Textiles", 8 percent to \Base metals", 6 percent to \Mineral products", and 5 percent to \Chemical products",
\Plastics and rubber", \Prepared food, beverages, tobacco" each.
7include only rms based in Continental Portugal and their full-time employees, age between
16 and 65, working a minimum of 25 and a maximum of 80 total hours per week. In the
nal data set used for wage regressions the total number of rms (traders and non-traders)
by year ranges from 18,288 in 1995 to 29,458 in 2005, while the total number of employees
varies from 636,690 in 1995 to 626,216 in 2005, yielding a minimum (across specications)
of 4,272,213 person-years. More interestingly, slightly more than one in ve manufacturing
rms (32 percent in 1995 and 25 percent in 2005) is engaged in foreign markets either as
exporter or as importer (or as both). For comparison, Bernard & Jensen (1995) report for
U.S. manufacturing plants in 1987 that 15 percent export; Eaton et al. (2004) report that 17
percent of French manufacturing rms export in 1986, and Irarrazabal et al. (2010) report
that about 40 percent of Norwegian manufacturing rms are exporters.
The percentage of rms engaged in international markets can be decomposed according
to the mode of participation: about 7.4 percent of all rms are exporters-only, 6.5 percent
are importers-only and 11.1 percent are exporters-importers in 2005. Again, for comparisons,
Muuls & Pisu (2009) report that the corresponding percentages for Belgian rms are 4.3,
8.0 and 10.7 respectively. In terms of sales, exports correspond, in 2005, to approximately
29 percent of total sales of the manufacturing sector, while imports correspond to about 23
percent of the same total sales.5
2.1 Descriptive statistics
The special characteristics of traders can be discerned more clearly from Table 1, which
presents several statistics from pooled 1995-2005 data, by rm international trade status (non
trader, exporter-only, importer-only and exporter-importer). Table 1 presents statistics on
rm-level and worker-level variables used in our estimations and referring to observations for
which all covariates used in the econometric analysis of Section 4 are jointly available. Panel
A reports statistics on variables measured at the rm level while Panel B present variables
measured at the worker level. We nd that mean sales and mean size are much higher in the
case of traders than non-traders (1336 thousands euros or more vs 508 thousands euros; 26
workers or more vs. 13 workers); among traders, rms that both import and export are the
biggest both in terms of total sales and in terms of number of workers (12.8 million euros
and more than 111 workers), followed by importers-only (3.3m euros and 35 workers) and
5Additional information on the two data sets and the variables used can be found in Appendices A and B.
8exporters-only (508 thousands euros and 13 workers). Mean rm size (in terms of number of
workers) is much higher in the case of traders although less than proportionately in terms of
the sales gap, suggesting greater productivity amongst traders.6 Firms that trade in foreign
markets, (i) are more likely to be foreign-owned, (ii) are older, and (iii) have more plants than
those rms that nor import neither export.
There are not major dierences across rm types in terms of the schooling, experience, or
average hours worked of their employees; however, workers in rms that trade tend to exhibit
higher levels of tenure and exporters-only employ a more feminine workforce.7 Furthermore,
of particular interest for our study, we nd that hourly wages are considerably higher at
rms that trade than in rms that only sell at the domestic market: in the latter case the
average real hourly wage is 3.64 euros per hour, while exporters-only (importers-only) pay
3.76 euros per hour (4.86 euros per hour) and exporter-importers pay 5.12 euros per hour.
Similar comparisons arise from the analysis of medians instead of means.
Table 1 also makes clear the potential economy-level eects from the wage practices of
rms that trade as they account for a large proportion of the manufacturing workforce: more
than 3 millions workers-year were employed by rms that export and/or import, compared to
about 1.2 millions in the case of manufacturing-sector rms that do not trade.
3 Decomposing the wage premia
In this Section we review the methodology introduced by Gelbach (2010) by presenting a sim-
plied version of the econometric specication adopted in the analysis performed in Section
4. The objective pursued in Section 4 is to study how the exporter, importer, and exporter-
importer unconditional wage premia change when one includes additional covariates in the
econometric model, like worker- and rm-level observables or worker-level (time-invariant)
unobservables. The methodology proposed by Gelbach (2010) allows to quantify the contri-
bution of each of these additional covariates independently from the order in which covariates
are partialled out. As a consequence, the common practice of sequentially adding covariates
and interpreting the change in the coecient of the variable of interest (i.e., in our case, the
coecients associated to being an exporter or an importer) as due to the introduction of the
6Starting from Melitz (2003), many trade models with heterogeneous rms and xed costs of exporting
show that the most productive and bigger rms self-select into export markets.
7Using a a Danish matched worker-rm data set, Munch & Skaksen (2008) nd that rms with high export
intensities have longer job tenure.
9last covariate is not correct and can lead to large biases. Consider a linear population model
with two sets of covariates, X1 and X2,
Y = X11 + X2 1 + 1 = 1 + ~ X
~ X
1 + ~ M 
~ M
1 + S S
1 + 1: (1)
In our example, Y is the (log real) wage of a worker. X1 includes a constant, and one dummy
variable equal to one if the rm that employs the worker is exporting ( ~ X). X2 contains instead
another dummy variable equal to one if the rm is importing ( ~ M), and rm size (log of the
number of employees), S. We consider, in this example, the importer dummy and rm size
for the following reasons. The export status of a rm is a good predictor of its import status
Bernard & Schott (2009), implying that rm- or worker-level studies of the link between
exports and wages that do not control for imports Schank et al. (2007), Munch & Skaksen
(2008), Frias et al. (2009) may over- or underestimate the impact of exports. Firm size is
well-known to be positively related to wages and to rms' trade participation. The exporter
unconditional wage premium is found by including only X1 among the covariates,
Y = 2 + ~ X
~ X
2 + 2: (2)
The well-known omitted variable bias formula tells us that if there is a correlation between
the exporter status and one or more of the covariates in X2 and these have an eect of their
own on wages (i.e.  1 6= 0) then dropping X2 introduces a bias, , on the coecient of X1,
the exporter conditional wage premium. In population terms,





1X2 1 = 1 +   1 = 1 + 
where   is the matrix of coecients from projecting the columns of X2 on the columns of X1,
X2 = X1  + ";
or, in more detailed form,
~ M =  
~ M
0 + ~ X 
~ M
~ X + "
~ M (3)
S =  S
0 + ~ X S
~ X + "S (4)
10where ~ M, and S, as explained above, are the columns of X2.  S
~ X tells us the dierence between
the mean size (after partialling out the other elements of X1) of rms that export and the
mean size of all other rms. Similarly,  
~ M
~ X tells us the dierence between two ratios: the
fraction of exporters that also import, and the fraction of nonexporters that imports (after
partialling out the other elements of X1). We can now decompose  into the contribution of
the dierent elements of X2,
 ~ X =
 S
~ X S





~ X  
~ M






~ X and 
~ M
~ X represent, respectively, the part of the exporter unconditional wage premium
explained by rm size and import status, respectively. The above parameters are clearly
interpretable as the mean exporter-nonexporters gap in rm size or import status, scaled by
each covariate's wage-equation impact. These covariate mean dierences and wage-equation
eects are population parameters that do not depend on the order in which covariates are
introduced. Note that if there were no mean dierences, for example, in rm size between,
say, exporters and nonexporters then the  S
~ X would be zero. In this case, variation in rm
size would explain none of the exporters-nonexporters gap in mean wages. The same would
hold if rm size had not eect on wages, so that  S
1 = 0. As shown in Section 4 this is not
the case.
Table 2, using the data described in Section (2), reports the estimates of the models in equation
(1) and (2), and of two additional intermediate models.8 Column (1) in the Table shows that
the unconditional wage premium for exporters is about 19 percent.9 Column (4) shows that,
as soon as the importer dummy and rm size are added to the model, the exporter wage
premium disappears and actually becomes slightly negative. The change in the exporter wage
premium from column (1) to column (4) is very large: 22.2 percentage points. Our goal is
to quantify how much of this gure is due to variation in the importer status and how much
to variation in the size of the rm. The methodology described above allows us to do so
considering only the model in column (1) and the model in column (4), i.e. the base and full
models. The standard sequential approach instead requires the estimation of one additional
model: either the one in column (2) or the one in column (3). The choice is completely
8We included in each regression a set of year dummies. Moreover, we used, for comparison purposes, the
same sample of 4,272,213 observations that will be used in the main analysis of Section 4.
9Bernard et al. (2007), using 2002 data for the Census of Manufactures, nd that the unconditional wage
premium for U.S. rms is 17 percent.
11arbitrary. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 report the estimates of two intermediate models:
one only with the importer dummy and one only with rm size. There are two possible
sequential approaches, both starting from the model in column (1):
 Sequence 1: the rst option is to include the importer dummy rst (column 2), interpret
the change in the exporter dummy coecient as due to the conditioning on import status
(i.e. 14.7 percent, as reported in Table 3), and then condition on rm size (column 4),
and interpret the additional change in the exporter dummy coecient as due to the
presence of the rm size variable (i.e. 22.2-14.7=7.5 percent).
 Sequence 2: the second option is to include rm size rst (column 3), interpret the
change in the exporter dummy coecient as due to the conditioning on rm size (i.e.
16.8 percent), and then condition on the importer dummy (column 4), and interpret
the additional change in the exporter dummy coecient as due to the presence of the
importer dummy variable (i.e. 22.2-16.8=5.4 percent).
Therefore, according to the (arbitrary) choice of either Sequence 1 or Sequence 2, it's either
the importer dummy or rm size that matters the most in explaining the change in the
exporter wage gap. Panel B in Table 3 summarizes these ndings and compares them with
the results of the Gelbach (2010) decompositions reported in Panel A. The rst row in Panel
A reports the estimates of the   coecients of the auxiliary regressions of equation (3) and
(4). Exporters are much more likely to be importers as well (+59.8 percentage points) than
nonexporters ( 
~ M
~ X ) while the mean-size gap between exporters and nonexporters is about 6
workers ( 
~ S
~ X). The second row in Panel A shows that both being an importer ( 
~ M
1 ) and being
a larger rm ( S
1 ) has a positive impact on workers' wages. Finally, the third row in Panel A
reports the delta coecients S
~ X (13.8 percent) and 
~ M
~ X (8.4 percent), that together sum up to
the overall exporter wage gap dierential (22.2 percent). Gelbach (2010) decomposition shows
the true contribution of the importer status and rm size in explaining the exporter wage gap
dierence. Both variables play a substantial role. The contribution of each is in-between the
two possible results of the sequential approach. However, rm size is responsible for the bigger
change (13.8 vs. 8.4 percentage points). As reported in Panel B, the choice of the sequential
approach exposes the econometrician to substantially biased results. For example, the role
played by rm size can be overstated by 22 percent (Sequence 2) or understated by 46 percent
(Sequence 1). These are very large deviations. Applying Gelbach (2010) decomposition we
12can understand the determinants of the change in the exporter status coecient between any
two models and, in particular, we can ask what drives the large bias from using the importer-
size sequential addition approach. Consider the dierence between the estimate of 0.045 in
column (2) of Table 2, and column (4) full-specication estimate of -0.030. The dierence
between these estimates, +0.075, is the explained-gap component attributed to rm size using
the importer-size sequential addition approach. The following projection relationship can help
understanding why the rm size component plays a dierent role when using the sequential
approach or Gelbach (2010) conditional decomposition approach:
S =  
S( ~ M)
0 + ~ X 
S( ~ M)
~ X + ~ M 
S( ~ M)
~ M + "S( ~ M): (5)
The S( ~ M) superscript notation indicates that the   parameters come from an equation relat-
ing rm size to all the X1 variables, as well as the importer dummy. We can therefore use the
equivalence result above to show that the dierence in the coecient of the exporter dummy
from the specication in column (2) of Table 2 to the specication in column (4) of the same
table is
S
~ X( ~ M) =  
S( ~ M)
~ X  S
1 : (6)
We know from above that the estimate of S




~ X( ~ M) by the Table 2 rm size coecient in the full specication wage equation,
 S
1 . The result is  
S( ~ M)
~ X = 0:972. Relative to the conditional decomposition, the bias in
S
~ X( ~ M) is thus
BiasS( ~ M) = S








1 = (0:972   1:788)  0:077 =  :063: (7)
Equation (7) shows that the estimated bias in the part of the explained gap attributed
to a covariate depends on two factors. One factor is the dierence made by conditioning
on importer status when estimating the exporter-nonexporter wage gap, i.e., the dierence
between  
S( ~ M)
~ X and  S
~ X. The other factor that aects the bias from using sequential covariate
addition to estimate the rm size share of the explained gap is  S
1 , the estimated return to
rm size. Using (7) therefore we nd that the bias in the contribution of rm size is  0:063,
the same number reported in Panel B of Table 3. Since the biases in the components at-
tributed to the importer dummy and rm size must sum to zero, it immediately follows that
13the sequential-addition bias in the component attributed to the importer dummy when it is
added rst to the base specication is equal to  BiasS( ~ M).
In the next Section we apply Gelbach (2010) decomposition to a more complex econometric
model. Our aim is to quantify the importance of a set of rm-level and worker-level vari-
ables in explaining the exporter and importer wage gaps. While the intuition underlying the
decomposition methodology is the same as the one just illustrated, the implementation is
considerably more complex due to the presence of a large set of covariates. Fortunately, the
methodology is quite exible. Gelbach (2010) illustrates an easy way to carry out the decom-
position. In particular, he shows that it is not necessary to run auxiliary regressions for each
covariate in X2 but it is possible to group covariates. This proves to be particularly handy in
the case X2 includes industry and time dummies or worker xed eects, as it happens below.
4 Main results
The main goal of this paper is to assess and compare the eects of exporting and importing
in terms of workers' pay. Our analysis is based on the estimation of wage equations with a
particularly large set of control variables, including worker xed eects. The identication
of the eects of interest is therefore based on the assumption that, given such large set of
controls, variation across observations in trade status is random.10 In this section, we make
use of indicators of trade activity that are dierent from those used in Section 3: a set of
three dummy variables, indicating whether or not a rm only exports, X, whether or not a
rm only imports, M, and whether or not a rm both exports and imports, XM. In Section
3, the goal was to illustrate a new methodology and to make the point that the results in
the previous literature, focused only on exporters, can be misleading. In this Section the
goal is to quantify the wage gap associated to three dierent sets of rms, characterized by
participation in export markets, import markets, or both.
10Given the increasing availability of worker-level data and the trend in the literature, we estimates our
wage equations only on worker-level data and not on rm-level data. This allows us to address more directly
any compositional biases that may explain the rm-level results. For instance, when rms begin importing or
exporting they may also adjust their hiring policies towards more skilled employees. Although we can control
for several human capital and other variables, such dierences in personnel quality over time may still be
obscured in the data in such a way that a premium is estimated even if such wage dierential can actually be
accounted for by worker quality dierences. By following each worker over time, we minimize such potential
bias.





in which yijt is logarithm of the real hourly total wage of worker i in rm j in year t, Xj(i;t);t,
Mj(i;t);t and XMj(i;t);t are the explanatory variables of interest, dummy variables equal to
one if worker i is employed in year t in a rm j that exports only, imports only or exports
and imports, respectively.11 Non-traders (i.e. rms that nor export neither import) are the
excluded category. Wijt and Fj(i;t);t are vectors of worker and rm control variables. Worker
observables include schooling (number of years), a quadratic in experience and in tenure, a
gender dummy and the log of hours worked. Firm-level observables include rm size (log
of the number of employees), (log) total sales, the number of plants, a foreign ownership
dummy, and (log) rm age.12 Indj(i;t);t and Regj(i;t);t are a set of 23 industry dummies
and 18 regions dummies, respectively. Finally, t, and i are time, and worker xed eects,
respectively.13 Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation 8 (the "full model") and
a simpler specication that only includes the trade status dummies (the "base model").14
Several results are of interest. The rst result is that once export and import status
are simultaneously controlled for, the unconditional wage premium paid by export-only rms
is much smaller than the one usually found in the literature (3.5 percent) while the one
paid by rms that also imports is very large (23.9 percent). Firms that both export and
import pay their worker a even higher average wage (29.1 percent). As mentioned above,
the export status of a rm is a good predictor of its import status Bernard & Schott (2009),
implying that studies that do not control for imports may overestimate the impact of exports.
The second result conrms and, to some extent, reinforces a tendency seen in the previous
literature: the introduction of rms' and workers' controls explain the almost totality of
the unconditional wage premium. In the "full model", the exporter-only wage gap is not
11Real hourly wages are computed considering all compensation components and diving by the number of
regular and overtime hours worked in the reference month. See the Appendix for futher details.
12A rm is considered foreign-owned if at least 50 percent of its equity is foreign-held.
13Note that, since the goal of the analysis is to apply the decomposition outlined in Section 3, we need to
estimate the full set of year, industry, region, and worker xed eects. While year, industry, and region can
potentially be included as dummies, the high dimensionality of the worker xed eects makes the problem
computationally harder. We address this estimation matter by drawing on the algorithm put forward by
Guimaraes & Portugal (2009). See Carneiro et al. (2009) for an application, also based on the QP data set.
14Note that the education and gender dummies are omitted from the "full model" (and included in the
worker xed eects) due to insucient time variation in those characteristics. Both in the "base model" and
in the "full model" standard errors are robust, allowing for clustering at the worker level.
15signicantly dierent from zero, the importer-only wage gap is signicant but very small
(0.003), and the exporter-importer wage gap is signicant and actually slightly negative (-
0.004). All other covariates behave as expected: there are positive but diminishing returns for
experience and tenure, wages are positively correlated with rm size, sales, foreign ownership,
and negatively correlated with rm age. The model t is pretty high, with an R2 equal to
0.92.
The main result is found by applying the decomposition outlined in Section 3 to the "base"
and "full" models of Table 4. Table 5 reports the results. Unlike in Section 3, we apply
the decomposition to explain the change in the wage gap associated to three variables: the
exporter-only (in column 1), importer-only (in column 2), and exporter-importer dummies
(in column 3). Instead of reporting the absolute  coecients associated to each type of
covariate we report them as a share of the total change in the wage gap when moving from
the "base" to the "full" model. The results are striking. The decomposition reveals that the
wage premium for workers employed by rms that only export is associated to rms' and
workers' characteristics that are very dierent from those associated to the wage premium
for workers employed by rms that also imports. Firms that only export pay higher wages
mainly because they are bigger and sell more. The workers that they employ are not, in
general, "better" or "more able" than average. Firms that also imports (imports-only or both
exports and imports) also pay higher wages because they are bigger and sell more but these
factors denitely play a less important role. On the contrary, these rms, and among these
those that only imports in particular, decisively employ "better" or "more able" workers.
More specically, in the case of export-only rms, rm-level observables (size, total sales,
number of plants, and rm age) account for 80 percent of the wage gap, with the main role
played by rm size (32 percent) and rm total sales (40 percent). Firm age also account for
7 percent of the wage gap, with younger rms paying higher wages, while an additional 10
percent of the wage gap is explained by the industry distribution of exporters. Worker-level
observables play a substantially smaller role, a total of 7 percent: experience (5 percent) has
a negative impact on the exporter wage gap. More strikingly, worker xed eects, capturing
all the time-invariant unobserved workers' characteristics, have a limited and negative impact
on the exporter wage gap (2 percent).
The picture is quite dierent for importers.15 Firm-level observables (size, total sales, number
15For the sake of brevity we focus on the description of the dierences between export-only and import-only
16of plants, and rm age) are still important but only account for 30 percent of the wage gap,
with the main role played by rm size (12 percent) and rm total sales (17 percent). Younger
rms still pay higher wages, and the industry distribution of import-only rms is positively
related to the wage gap but their role is much smaller (4 percent overall). The main dierence
lies in the role played by workers' (time-invariant) unobserved characteristics: workers' xed
eects account for a whopping 66 percent of the wage gap. The sign is positive: the wage bill
of importers is higher because workers' are on average more able.
As mentioned above, a number of recent papers (e.g. Eaton et al., 2011, Helpman, Itskhoki,
and Redding, 2011) have tried to embed a more realistic treatment of labor markets in models
of trade with heterogeneous rms. In this respect, our results can provide a guidance for the
development of trade theories that model the labor market more \realistically". In Eaton et
al. (2011), wages, set through bargaining, are an increasing function of the productivity of the
rm. Through bargaining, workers get a share of the prots and therefore a higher wage. Our
results are consistent with Eaton et al. (2011) in the sense that we do nd that both rms'
sales and size are positively associated with a wage premium for exporters. Helpman, Itskhoki,
and Redding (2011) propose a trade model with heterogeneous rms and search and matching
frictions. More productive rms have large revenues, match with more workers, and screen to
higher ability thresholds. As a result they have workforces of higher average ability and pay
higher wages. While we also nd that rm's size and sales are positively correlated with a wage
premium for exporters, we do not nd that exporters hire workers that are, on average, more
able. Actually, the workers xed eects in our wage regressions play a slightly negative role in
explaining the exporters' wage premium. On the contrary, we nd that importers denitely
hire workers that have better unobserved time-invariant characteristics. In this respect, our
results suggest that the channel suggested by Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2011) seems
more adequate to explain the behavior of importers instead of exporters. Overall, a robust
result that emerges from this Section is that the hiring policy of exporters is quite dierent
than the one of importers. While rm size and sales, even though to a dierent extent, are
positively related to the wage bill both for exporters and importers, the average ability of the
workforce plays a dierent role: importers denitely have a better workforce, exporters don't.
rms, with the understanding that exporter-importers behave similarly to import-only rms.
175 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the relationship between exporting, importing, and wage premia
using a rich matched employer-employee data set from Portugal. We make two main method-
ological contributions. First, we take into account the importing behavior of rms. Given
that the export status of a rm is a good predictor of its import status, rm- or worker-level
studies of the link between exports and wages that do not control for imports may over-
or underestimate the impact of exports. Second, we use a simple methodology introduced in
Gelbach (2010) to quantify the importance of rm's observed characteristics, and workers' ob-
served and unobserved time-invariant characteristics in determining the exporters', importers,
and exporters-importers' wage premia. The main advantage of this methodology is that it
is not sensitive to the order of introduction of the covariates. As shown in Gelbach (2010),
the strategy of sequentially adding covariates and interpreting the change in the coecient
of interest as associated to the introduction of each covariate can lead to substantial biases
in the results. A robust result that emerges form this paper is that the hiring policy of ex-
porters is quite dierent than the one of importers. While rm size and sales are, to dierent
extents, important components of the wage gap both for exporters and importers, importers
hire workers that are overwhelmingly more able than the average. Workers at exporting rms,
on the contrary, are no dierent in terms of unobserved time-invariant characteristics. Our
analysis provides a useful guidance for recent theories that aim at explaining participation
both in export and import markets and at including non-neoclassical labor market features.
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Appendix: Data
A. INE trade data
The INE trade data include all export and import transactions by rms that are located in
Portugal, on a monthly basis. These data are derived from customs returns forms in the case
of extra-EU trade and from a special form supplied to the Portuguese statistics agency, INE -
Instituto Nacional de Estat stica (Intrastat) in the case of intra-EU trade. Firms are required
to provide information on their trade transactions if the volume of exports or imports in the
previous year or two years before was higher than 60,000 euros and 85,000 euros respectively.
Overall, the data amount to the ocial total exports and imports of Portugal.
Each transaction record includes the rm tax identier, an eight digit Combined Nomen-
clature product code, the value of the transaction, the quantity of transacted goods (expressed
in kilograms), the destination/origin country, the type of transport, the relevant international
commercial term (FOB, CIF, etc) and a variable indicating the type of transaction (transfer
of ownership after payment, return of a product, etc). Also see Amador & Opromolla (2008)
for more information about the data and several descriptive statistics.
B. QP labor data
Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal dataset matching rms and workers based in Por-
tugal. The data are made available by the Ministry of labor and Social Security, drawing on
a compulsory annual census of all rms in Portugal that employ at least one worker. The
Ministry of labor and Social Security has been conducting this survey since 1982 and the
employment and wage data refer to the month of October since 1994. In our analysis we use
information for the period 1995 until 2005. The data also cover individual information on all
personnel working for each rm in the reference month, except for 2001.
The administrative nature of the data and their public availability at the workplace -
as required by law - imply a high degree of coverage and reliability. Our sample includes all
manufacturing rms based in Continental Portugal and their full-time employees, age between
16 and 65, working a minimum of 25 and a maximum of 80 total hours per week.
The variables available in the data set include the rm's location, industry, total employ-
ment, sales, ownership structure (foreign, domestic private and domestic public), and legal
setting. At the worker's level, the data set includes information on gender, age, occupation,
schooling, hiring date, earnings (ve dierent variables), duration of work (three dierent
variables), as well as information about collective bargaining.
The mean wage is computed adding base and overtime wages plus tenure- and performance-
related compensation and dividing by the number of regular and overtime hours worked in
the reference month. Sales, exports and imports are expressed in 2004 billion euros. Gross
wages are deated by the Consumers Price Index (made available by INE) to 2004 euros.
We classify rms as foreign-owned if they have a foreign participation in their equity of
at least 50 percent. 78 percent of the rms in our sample with a non-zero foreign ownership
meet this threshold.
Personnel on short-term leave (such as sickness, maternity, strike or holidays) are included,
whereas personnel on long-term leave (such as military service) are not reported. Civil ser-
22vants, the self-employed and domestic service are not covered, and the coverage of agriculture
is low given its low share of wage-earners.
C. Theoretical discussion
There are two main theoretical views one can appeal to in order to interpret any wage dier-
ences, in particular those among exporters, importers and non-traders, which we study in this
paper. In the rst case, competitive views of the labor market would regard any wage pre-
miums as a reection of worker (unobserved) quality. For instance, econometric studies may
draw on less information on workers than that available to employers when hiring, retaining
or dismissing employees. In this case the wage premiums could correspond to systematic dif-
ferences between the workforces in dierent types of rms and not to wages above the outside
options of workers.
Similarly, wage dierences could correspond to compensating dierentials, for instance if
the working conditions of rms that trade were disadvantageous compared to those of rms
that do not trade. As an example, international traders may be subject to greater risk in
terms of customer orders or production conditions, in which case workers would demand
premiums.16 Alternatively, international traders may be able to achieve less risk through
international diversication in their input and/or output markets, in which case workers
would be willing to be paid less.
A second main theoretical view involves non-competitive mechanisms in the labor market.
These typically evolve from search frictions or informational imperfections, for instance in
terms of the matching between job-seekers and vacancies or in terms of the monitoring of
worker eort. In the case of eciency wages, rms that trade may require higher eort from
their workers (see Verhoogen (2008) for the case of exporters). One example would be if
consumers in destination countries value quality more than in the origin country. Firms that
wish to export will then have to adjust the quality of their product mix and to motivate
workers to exert more eort - for instance through wages that are suciently higher than the
worker's best alternative.17
An alternative non-competitive mechanism that would generate a wage premium is rent
sharing. In an important contribution, Kramarz (2008) emphasizes that importing can af-
fect wages both because it changes the overall quasi-rent but also because it can aect the
rms and the workers threat points when bargaining. There are a number of reasons why
these threat points may change: for instance, imports of intermediate products may provide
workers with hold-up opportunities when the rm has to purchase these inputs in advance.
This might explain why importers pay more than non-importers (including exporters-only).
However, imports of nished goods by the rm or by its competitors may weaken the employ-
ees' bargaining position if these imports result in a decrease of the workers' outside oers.
Moreover, exporters may also need to make specic investments that would generate hold-up
opportunities for their workers.18
16For example, Fillat & Garetto (2009) show that exporters tend to have higher earning yields and returns
than rms selling only in their domestic market. They develop a real option value model where rms are
heterogeneous in terms of productivity to show that exporters (and, even more, multinationals) are more
exposed to risk because of the sunk costs that they paid to enter the foreign market.
17Moreover, rms that want to export might need to update their equipment and import better machines
from abroad (Iacovone & Javorcik (2008) show that the introduction of new export products tends to be
preceded by investment in physical assets and technology acquisition). These rms might pay workers even
more because the marginal benet of convincing workers to exert more eort is higher due to the interaction
of workers' eort with better machines.
18See also Amiti & Davis (2008) who consider a model with fair wages, another non-competitive mechanism,
where wages in the rm are proportional to rm's prots and not necessarily equal to the worker's outside
option; and Davidson et al. (2008).
23A related point is that rms that trade may face dierent elasticities of demand of the
products they sell. In particular, the elasticity of demand with respect to the product price
may be higher for exporters than for non-exporters to the extent that the international market
is more competitive than the domestic market. In this case, as indicated by Marshall's rules,
exporters will be less prone to concede wage premia than importers. Taking one step further,
the level of competition faced by exporters may depend on the technological content of the
product (or variety within a product) that they sell. Firms that are able to sell high technology
goods may be able to enter into markets with higher product dierentiation and a lower degree
of competition. As a consequence they might be able to secure higher rents that could be
partially passed on to their workers. Similarly, rms that are able to improve the quality of
their products by using better (higher quality and/or cheaper) intermediate inputs or machines
might be able to better face competition in international markets as well as on the domestic
market.
The non-competitive models have a strong potential explanatory power given the evidence
that exporters are more productive than rms that sell only on the domestic market.19 In
this case, exporters gain higher prots than non-exporters and might pass on some of those
gains to their workers through some form of rent sharing.
Moreover, recent research on the productivity eects from international trade is placing
emphasis on the role of importing too. To begin with, exporters are frequently importers as
well Bernard & Schott (2009), in which case part of the productivity advantage of exporters
can be due to their sourcing inputs from foreign markets Altomonte & Bekes (2009). In
any case, either that of importers only or exporter-importers, access to cheaper imported
inputs can again raise productivity via learning, variety, and quality eects Amiti & Konings
(2007), Kasahara & Rodrigue (2008), Goldberg et al. (2008), Halpern et al. (2009). Importers
arguably have greater choice in the sourcing of their inputs and can exploit any gaps between
international and national prices, resulting in productivity or cost-eciency dierences.
Having reviewed the explanations above for either true or spurious wage premiums among
importers and exporters when compared to non-traders, we underline that most if not all
arguments apply equally to importers and exporters. However, the intensity of any worker
heterogeneity or productivity eects may still vary depending on the specic trade status of
the rm. In particular, importing and exporting may enhance a rm's protability dierently,
particularly when products of dierent technological level are being transacted.
19Some research has argued that exporters are ex-ante more ecient and, as such, are able to sustain xed
and variable trade costs and self-select into export markets Clerides et al. (1998), Bernard & Bradford Jensen
(1999). Other studies have shown that, on top of self-selection, exporters might become more productive
because they learn from exporting Van Biesebroeck (2005), especially when goods are sold to high-income
countries De Loecker (2007).
24Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Pooled 1995-2005 Data
Panel A: Firm-level description
Non-Trading Firms Exporters-only
Mean Med. S.D. Obs. Mean Med. S.D. Obs.
Sales 507.97 218.61 3313.44 149,791 1335.55 703.28 5177.92 17,105
Size 12.71 8.00 20.47 149,791 25.97 18.00 29.26 17,105
Foreign (0/1) 0.00 0.00 0.06 149,791 0.01 0.00 0.10 17,105
# Plants 1.14 1.00 1.55 149,791 1.11 1.00 1.21 17,105
Firm Age 13.27 10.00 12.05 149,791 17.32 14.00 14.63 17,105
Importers-only Exporters-Importers
Sales 3348.86 1282.65 11200.00 18,867 12800.00 3537.87 72100.00 28,553
Size 35.23 20.00 61.62 18,867 111.34 57.00 208.12 28,553
Foreign (0/1) 0.04 0.00 0.20 18,867 0.11 0.00 0.31 28,553
# Plants 1.29 1.00 1.54 18,867 1.41 1.00 2.05 28,553
Firm Age 17.93 15.00 14.29 18,867 22.83 19.00 18.11 28,553
Panel B: Worker-level description
Non-Trading Firms Exporters-only
Mean Med. S.D. Obs. Mean Med. S.D. Obs.
Schooling 6.04 6.00 2.80 1,170,610 5.93 4.00 2.89 295,577
Experience 24.86 23.00 12.02 1,170,610 25.29 24.00 11.99 295,577
Tenure 7.48 5.00 7.84 1,170,610 8.96 7.00 8.51 295,577
Female (0/1) 0.42 0.00 0.49 1,170,610 0.49 0.00 0.50 295,577
Hours Worked 39.90 39.92 2.54 1,170,610 39.86 39.92 2.44 295,577
Hourly Wage 3.64 3.01 2.09 1,170,610 3.76 3.09 2.16 295,577
Importers-only Exporters-Importers
Schooling 6.82 6.00 3.54 473,718 6.86 6.00 3.54 2,332,308
Experience 24.88 24.00 12.05 473,718 25.10 24.00 12.06 2,332,308
Tenure 9.70 7.00 8.90 473,718 11.81 9.00 9.87 2,332,308
Female (0/1) 0.36 0.00 0.48 473,718 0.43 0.00 0.50 2,332,308
Hours Worked 39.97 39.92 2.91 473,718 40.25 39.92 2.96 2,332,308
Hourly Wage 4.86 3.74 3.39 473,718 5.12 3.99 3.48 2,332,308
Notes: Panel A presents summary statistics of rm-level variables while Panel B presents summary statistics of worker-level
variables. Summary statistics are computed pooling the data for the 1995-2005 period. Sales are expressed in thousands
euro. Firm age, schooling, experience, and tenure are expressed in number of years. The hourly wage is in euro. The column
"Obs." lists the number of rm-year observations in Panel A and the number of worker-year observations in Panel B. See
the data appendix for variable denitions.
25Table 2: A Simple Example of Sequence-sensitivity: Exporter
Wage Premium, Importer Status, and Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coecient on Exporter ~ X 0:193 0:045 0:024  0:030
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Coecient on Importer ~ M 0:246 0:141
(0.001) (0.001)
Coecient on Firm Size S 0:094 0:077
(0.001) (0.000)
Included covariates
Importer ~ M (0/1) N Y N Y
Firm Size (log) N N Y Y
Notes: All equations include year dummies and are estimated on the same sample
of 4,272,213 observations used in Section 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
allowing for clustering at the worker level. Signicance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5
percent; * 10 percent.
26Table 3: Understanding the Decomposition of ^  ~ X
Panel A: Conditional Decomposition Components
Importer ~ M Firm Size S Total
^   ~ X 0.598 1.788
 1 0.141 0.077
^  ~ X (= ^   ~ X   1) 0.084 0.138 0.222
Panel B: Sequential Decomposition Components
Importer ~ M Firm Size S Total
Sequence 1: Importer-Size
Explained gap 0.147 0.075 0.222
Bias 0.063 - 0.063 0.000
Sequence 2: Size-Importer
Explained gap 0.054 0.168 0.222
Bias -0.084 +0.084 0.000
Notes: Panel A reports the estimated coecients from the auxiliary regres-
sions of equations (3) and (4) (in the rst row), the estimated coecients of the
importer dummy and rm size in the full model of equation (1) (second row),
and their product (third row). The latter represents the contribution of each
of the two covariates in explaining the wage gap according to the methodology
described in Section 3. Panel B reports the contribution ("explained gap") of the
importer dummy and rm size in explaining the wage gap according to the se-
quential approach. "Sequence 1" denotes the case in which the importer dummy
is introduced rst and rm size second. "Sequence 2" denotes the opposite case.
"Bias" represents the dierence, for each covariate, in the contribution according
to the two methodologies.
27Table 4: Trade status wage premia - base and full model
Base Model Full Model Dierence
Exporter only X 0:035 :001 -97%
(0.001) (0.001)
Importer only M 0:239 :003 -99%
(0.001) (0.001)










Hours Worked (ln)  0:192
(0.003)




Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0:029
(0.001)
Firm Age (ln)  0:010
(0.000)




Notes: Both the base and full models include year xed eects. The full model also includes: worker controls
(schooling, a quadratic in experience and in tenure, a gender dummy and the log of hours), rm controls (log of
number of employees, the number of establishments, and a foreign ownership dummy), a set of 18 region, and 23
industry dummies. The education and gender dummies are omitted (and included in the worker xed eects)
due to insucient time variation in those characteristics. Robust standard errors, allowing for clustering at
the worker level. Signicance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.
28Table 5: Trade status wage premia - Decomposition
Export-only X Import-only Y Export-import XM
Worker characteristics
Observables
Experience  0:06 0:00  0:01
Tenure 0:03 0:00 0:00
Hours 0:01 0:00 0:00
Unobservables
Worker Fixed Eect  0:02 0:69 0:52
Firm characteristics
Firm Size 0:45 0:12 0:21
Sales 0:55 0:17 0:24
# Plants 0:01 0:00 0:00
Foreign 0:01 0:01 0:02
Firm Age  0:09  0:02  0:02
Other
Region  0:01 0:01 0:00
Industry 0:14 0:02 0:03
Year 0:00 0:00 0:00
Total 1 1 1
Notes: Decomposition of the dierence between the X (Y, XM) coecients in the base and full model of
Table 4 according to the methodology presented in Section 3. Robust standard errors, allowing for clustering
at the worker level. Signicance levels: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.
29Banco de Portugal | Working Papers i
WORKING PAPERS
2010
1/10  MEASURING COMOVEMENT IN THE TIME-FREQUENCY SPACE
  — António Rua
2/10  EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM MATCHED FIRM-WORKER-PRODUCT PANELS
  — Pedro S. Martins, Luca David Opromolla
3/10  NONSTATIONARY EXTREMES AND THE US BUSINESS CYCLE
  — Miguel de Carvalho, K. Feridun Turkman, António Rua
4/10  EXPECTATIONS-DRIVEN CYCLES IN THE HOUSING MARKET
  — Luisa Lambertini, Caterina Mendicino, Maria Teresa Punzi
5/10  COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS OF BANK MERGERS
  — Pedro P. Barros, Diana Bonﬁ  m, Moshe Kim, Nuno C. Martins
6/10  THE EAGLE. A MODEL FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF MACROECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE EURO AREA
  — S. Gomes, P. Jacquinot, M. Pisani
7/10  A WAVELET APPROACH FOR FACTOR-AUGMENTED FORECASTING
  — António Rua
8/10  EXTREMAL DEPENDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL OUTPUT GROWTH: TALES FROM THE TAILS
  — Miguel de Carvalho, António Rua
9/10  TRACKING THE US BUSINESS CYCLE WITH A SINGULAR SPECTRUM ANALYSIS
  — Miguel de Carvalho, Paulo C. Rodrigues, António Rua
10/10 A MULTIPLE CRITERIA FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE BANK BRANCH POTENTIAL ATTRACTIVENESS
  — Fernando A. F. Ferreira, Ronald W. Spahr, Sérgio P. Santos, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
11/10 THE EFFECTS OF ADDITIVE OUTLIERS AND MEASUREMENT ERRORS WHEN TESTING FOR STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
IN VARIANCE
  — Paulo M. M. Rodrigues, Antonio Rubia
12/10 CALENDAR EFFECTS IN DAILY ATM WITHDRAWALS
  — Paulo Soares Esteves, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
13/10  MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF RANDOM VECTORS GENERATED BY AFFINE TRANSFORMATIONS OF 
INDEPENDENT TWO-PIECE NORMAL VARIABLES
  — Maximiano Pinheiro
14/10 MONETARY POLICY EFFECTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE PORTUGUESE FLOW OF FUNDS
  — Isabel Marques Gameiro, João Sousa
15/10 SHORT AND LONG INTEREST RATE TARGETS
  — Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia, Pedro Teles
16/10 FISCAL STIMULUS IN A SMALL EURO AREA ECONOMY
  — Vanda Almeida, Gabriela Castro, Ricardo Mourinho Félix, José Francisco Maria
17/10 FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC SPENDING VOLATILITY IN EUROPE
  — Bruno AlbuquerqueBanco de Portugal | Working Papers ii
18/10 GLOBAL POLICY AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND IN A LARGE-SCALE DSGE MODEL
  — S. Gomes, P. Jacquinot, R. Mestre, J. Sousa
19/10 LABOR IMMOBILITY AND THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF MONETARY POLICY IN A MONETARY UNION
  — Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia
20/10 TAXATION AND GLOBALIZATION
  — Isabel Correia
21/10 TIME-VARYING FISCAL POLICY IN THE U.S.
  — Manuel Coutinho Pereira, Artur Silva Lopes
22/10 DETERMINANTS OF SOVEREIGN BOND YIELD SPREADS IN THE EURO AREA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ECONOMIC 
AND FINANCIAL CRISIS
  — Luciana Barbosa, Sónia Costa
23/10 FISCAL STIMULUS AND EXIT STRATEGIES IN A SMALL EURO AREA ECONOMY 
  — Vanda Almeida, Gabriela Castro, Ricardo Mourinho Félix, José Francisco Maria
24/10 FORECASTING INFLATION (AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE?) WITH MONETARY AGGREGATES
  — João Valle e Azevedo, Ana Pereira
25/10 THE SOURCES OF WAGE VARIATION: AN ANALYSIS USING MATCHED EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE DATA
  — Sónia Torres,Pedro Portugal, John T.Addison, Paulo Guimarães
26/10 THE RESERVATION WAGE UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION NEXUS
  — John T. Addison, José A. F. Machado, Pedro Portugal
27/10 BORROWING PATTERNS, BANKRUPTCY AND VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION
  — José Mata, António Antunes, Pedro Portugal
28/10 THE INSTABILITY OF JOINT VENTURES: LEARNING FROM OTHERS OR LEARNING TO WORK WITH OTHERS
  — José Mata, Pedro Portugal
29/10 THE HIDDEN SIDE OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT: FIXED-TERM CONTRACTS AS A SCREENING DEVICE
  — Pedro Portugal, José Varejão
30/10 TESTING FOR PERSISTENCE CHANGE IN FRACTIONALLY INTEGRATED MODELS: AN APPLICATION TO WORLD 
INFLATION RATES
  — Luis F. Martins, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
31/10 EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES OF IMMIGRANTS IN PORTUGAL
  — Sónia Cabral, Cláudia Duarte
32/10 EVALUATING THE STRENGTH OF IDENTIFICATION IN DSGE MODELS. AN A PRIORI APPROACH
  — Nikolay Iskrev
33/10 JOBLESSNESS
  — José A. F. Machado, Pedro Portugal, Pedro S. Raposo
2011
1/11  WHAT HAPPENS AFTER DEFAULT? STYLIZED FACTS ON ACCESS TO CREDIT
  — Diana Bonﬁ  m, Daniel A. Dias, Christine Richmond
2/11  IS THE WORLD SPINNING FASTER? ASSESSING THE DYNAMICS OF EXPORT SPECIALIZATION
  — João AmadorBanco de Portugal | Working Papers iii
3/11  UNCONVENTIONAL FISCAL POLICY AT THE ZERO BOUND
  — Isabel Correia, Emmanuel Farhi, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Pedro Teles
4/11  MANAGERS’ MOBILITY, TRADE STATUS, AND WAGES
  — Giordano Mion, Luca David Opromolla
5/11  FISCAL CONSOLIDATION IN A SMALL EURO AREA ECONOMY
  — Vanda Almeida, Gabriela Castro, Ricardo Mourinho Félix, José Francisco Maria
6/11  CHOOSING BETWEEN TIME AND STATE DEPENDENCE: MICRO EVIDENCE ON FIRMS’ PRICE-REVIEWING 
STRATEGIES
  — Daniel A. Dias, Carlos Robalo Marques, Fernando Martins
7/11  WHY ARE SOME PRICES STICKIER THAN OTHERS? FIRM-DATA EVIDENCE ON PRICE ADJUSTMENT LAGS
  — Daniel A. Dias, Carlos Robalo Marques, Fernando Martins, J. M. C. Santos Silva
8/11  LEANING AGAINST BOOM-BUST CYCLES IN CREDIT AND HOUSING PRICES
  — Luisa Lambertini, Caterina Mendicino, Maria Teresa Punzi
9/11  PRICE AND WAGE SETTING IN PORTUGAL LEARNING BY ASKING
  — Fernando Martins
10/11 ENERGY CONTENT IN MANUFACTURING EXPORTS: A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS
  — João Amador
11/11 ASSESSING MONETARY POLICY IN THE EURO AREA: A FACTOR-AUGMENTED VAR APPROACH
  — Rita Soares
12/11 DETERMINANTS OF THE EONIA SPREAD AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
  — Carla Soares, Paulo M. M. Rodrigues
13/11 STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE EURO AREA COUNTRIES: A MODEL-
BASED ASSESSMENT
  — S. Gomes, P. Jacquinot, M. Mohr, M. Pisani
14/11 RATIONAL VS. PROFESSIONAL FORECASTS
  — João Valle e Azevedo, João Tovar Jalles
15/11 ON THE AMPLIFICATION ROLE OF COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS
  — Caterina Mendicino
16/11 MOMENT CONDITIONS MODEL AVERAGING WITH AN APPLICATION TO A FORWARD-LOOKING MONETARY 
POLICY REACTION FUNCTION
  — Luis F. Martins
17/11 BANKS’ CORPORATE CONTROL AND RELATIONSHIP LENDING: EVIDENCE FROM RETAIL LOANS
  — Paula Antão, Miguel A. Ferreira, Ana Lacerda
18/11 MONEY IS AN EXPERIENCE GOOD: COMPETITION AND TRUST IN THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF MONEY
  — Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Pedro Teles
19/11 ASSET RETURNS UNDER MODEL UNCERTAINTY: EVIDENCE FROM THE EURO AREA, THE U.K. AND THE U.S.
  — João Sousa, Ricardo M. Sousa
20/11 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS’ VS. PRIVATE ANALYSTS’ FORECASTS: AN EVALUATION
  — Ildeberta Abreu
21/11 HOUSING MARKET DYNAMICS: ANY NEWS?
  — Sandra Gomes, Caterina MendicinoBanco de Portugal | Working Papers iv
22/11 MONEY GROWTH AND INFLATION IN THE EURO AREA: A TIME-FREQUENCY VIEW
  — António Rua
23/11 WHY EX(IM)PORTERS PAY MORE: EVIDENCE FROM MATCHED FIRM-WORKER PANELS
  — Pedro S. Martins, Luca David Opromolla